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Q & A with Gordon Brown's security adviser on Northern Ireland peace process

abs-cbnNEWS.com | 11/05/2008 11:02 AM

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British Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s security adviser Robert Hannigan, 43, who was behind the successful Northern Island peace process, is in the Philippines to share Britain ’s experience with the peace negotiators of the stalled GRP-MILF peace process. He spoke with abs-cbnNEWS.com/Newsbreak’s Carmela Fonbuena and Philippine Star’s Amy Pamintuan. Excerpts of the interview:

What caused the decades-long conflict in Northern Island . Was it the difference in religion?

It was about identity—national identity and ethnic identity. Catholics in general felt they were Irish and part of Ireland . They felt that was their national identity. Protestants, who have been there since 16th and 17th century, felt British and didn’t feel part of the national Irish identity.

In Northern Ireland, one of the causes for supporting violence was the discrimination against Catholics in employment and housing.
In the 1970s, the government put through legislation to change that to enforce equality in employment and fair housing distribution. That had a huge impact overtime. It took 20 years or so but that removed many grievances that fed violence.

You can also argue that increasingly religion has become less important to identity in Northern Ireland . If you take the Republic of Ireland , there's a huge decline in religious observance. It’s changing. Religion in Europe has changed the way people have changed.

What triggered the Good Friday Agreement in April 1998? (It was ratified October of the same year.)

It’s really a combination of all sorts of things. The relationship between Britain and Ireland has changed, they had much healthier relationship. They decided they want to sort this out together.

You had a mixture of some really key individuals at the same time. British Prime Minister Tony Blair, US President Bill Clinton, and Ireland Prime Minister Bertie Ahern. These three people got home very well, had a change of outlook. We were prepared to work with each other.

The republic became a more prosperous place and a diverse place. A lot of things came together at the same time. It was a bit of luck and a bit of time. It’s hard to say what was the one decisive thing. Personalities had got a lot to do with it. It was political will.

What made Blair, Clinton, and Ahern good negotiators?

They had the will to do it, the ability to bring their constituency with them, to understand their constituency, and quite a lot of courage.

How much did political will contribute to the success of the peace process?

It was probably 70 to 80 percent. It was the political will not just by the government, but also the courageous leaders of the political parties and leaders of unions who decided they want to make peace even if that meant trusting people who for 30 years have been trying to kill them. The political will to turn a very efficient guerrilla movement into a political movement. That’s a very big thing to do. You have some very powerful characters. The countries could not have done them by themselves. It’s easier for country leaders and prime ministers to take risk than people who actually live on the ground.

What can the Philippines pick up from your experience?

I think the greatest message from the Northern island process is that there can be a solution. It’s difficult, it takes time, There are great disappointments along the way. But the prize is worth going for.

I don’t come here with solutions or come to negotiate. I just hope to share some of the lessons we learned.

Another factor that led to the successful peace process in Northern Ireland , accounts say, is that mothers and families helped in the peace process. How did this sentiment help?

I think there was real weariness with the war. But I’m not sure that it was enough to bring a settlement. I absolutely agree. There was a real appetite. A lot of people feeling we don’t want our children or the next generation to grow up in this.

But it is not in itself enough to bring a deal around. It really helps when it comes to public acceptance of the agreement. We could point to a better future for people. This agreement isn’t perfect but it holds out a future without violence for your children.

How transparent was the Northern Ireland peace process? Critics say this is where the Philippine government failed.

It’s a slightly different situation. The Good Friday Agreement was a slightly more public process. There were more parties involved and they negotiated publicly. But even so the final text was private until it emerged.

You couldn’t really air everything in public. Otherwise there would never have been an agreement. It’s easy to say you must do everything in public from a transparency point. It’s quite difficult to practice. If every step of the negotiation, you tell people exactly what you are talking about it allows people who are against any agreement to shoot it down.

Then there was a period between the publication of it (the agreement) and referendum to support it. There was then a big campaign led by the two governments to get it passed. A copy of the agreement was sent to every household. I didn’t suppose they read it but it was an important principle that it was sent to them.

There was a very lively public debate at that point. We won the referendum but it wasn’t easy. It was easier in one community than in the other. It was a long process.

Did you also have to contend with violence from those who opposed the agreement?

Once the IRA went on ceasefire, they did observe it. Now there were arguments that they breached it at any point. But in general the level of violence dropped dramatically.

But not everybody stopped the violence. It’s very difficult. Violence always makes things more difficult because it forces politicians to retreat early from taking risks or pushing their constituency to do further.

In the run up to the agreement, there were a lot of what we call sectarian killings. And then in the summer of Good Friday was the worst bombing, where 31 people were killed.

It illustrates that around the time when you get a breakthrough that is the moment of maximum opposition of when most people mostly likely to block it do everything they can to stop it. They may come from any side. That’s when you get the maximum opposition.

During the peace process, did the IRA have complete control over their members? This is a big problem of the MILF.

There was a split in the IRA before the Good Friday Agreement. It’s always very difficult to judge from the outside how much control there is. Certainly we worried, our government, that the leadership [had what it] needed to bring along the vast majority of its base. Part of the job of managing the process was to help them to do that.

How did you manage DDR (demobilization, disarmament and rehabilitation)?

The decommissioning was an issue that was addressed in a series of those difficult issues in the Good Friday Agreement. It had been a difficult issue for many years. It was politically very symbolic for both sides for different reasons.

DDR was implemented at the latter part of the nine-year process?

Yes.

Can you have DDR at the early stage of the peace process? This is what the government wants to do.

Well, it depends. Decommissioning has been discussed very early. Right at the start. Implementation took time. That was partly because the IRA argued they will not get to implement it until they have the legal progress and they didn’t feel that they were getting the legal progress that they were promised. Therefore they didn’t implement the decommissioning that they promised. Depends whose view you accept. It was agreed it should be dealt with as part of a bigger package.

as of 11/06/2008 11:19 AM