MANILA, Philippines - Proper coordination between members of the police force and the crisis management committee could have played a big part in pursuing 1 last option—an option that may have ended the hostage crisis on a happier note.

In his testimony before the Incident Investigation and Review Committee, Superintendent Orlando Yebra disclosed there is no formal negotiations team set up under the Philippine National Police to handle a hostage crisis like the incident exactly 2 weeks ago.

A dismissed police officer, Rolando Mendoza, took hostage several Hong Kong tourists to pressure government officials to reinstate him back to the service. After the 12-hour ordeal, 9 people died including the gunman himself.

Yebra acted as main negotiator then as directed by Manila Police District (MPD) head Chief Superintendent Rodolfo Magtibay.

As 1 of the police force’s more experienced negotiators, he said he already suggested the creation of a formal negotiations team with higher authorities as early as 2007.

Nonetheless, an “informal” negotiating team was created on August 23 under the crisis management committee (CMC).

As such, there was no hostage negotiations manual to speak of, he said.

“Nobody was acting then as team leader…I suppose I was the one…We were not able to talk about the compositions,” he said.

A graduate of law, Yebra explained that the force then could have been working under 2 protocols that resulted in confusion and unclear coordination.

Old protocol

He showed the review committee a prepared organizational skeleton, which he believed was still in effect on August 23.

During a crisis such as the hostage incident, the crisis management committee (CMC) should have been on top of things. The CMC is composed of the city mayor as the chairman and the vice mayor as the vice chairman.

He said the mayor can choose the on-scene commander or the ground commander to tackle the crisis. He presumed that it was Magtibay who acted as the ground commander.

The latter will then have to manage 4 groups: the negotiations, operations, service support and the public affairs groups.

He said some could have been confused with a recently approved protocol, where the CMC is now the same level as the NCR District Chief/CIMTG.

In the second protocol, the CMC does not exercise direct control over the 4 groups. There is a different leadership system under the new protocol.
Nonetheless, the latter is still not in effect since it has yet to be published by the UP Law Center, he said.

“So we had to function based on [Manila Mayor Alfredo Lim’s orders]…,” he said.

Yebra, however, noted he only saw Lim and Vice-Mayor Isko Moreno inside the command post then. He said he could not identify the other members.

Multi-tasking?

Even with the present set-up, however, the review committee noted Yebra played several roles that could have been commandeered by different persons based on the present crisis management protocol.

A member of the review committee, Teresita Ang-See, noted the CMC could have used the media to reach out to the gunman and present the last option—his temporary reinstatement to the service.

One of the tipping points in the negotiation was when Mendoza considered “mere garbage” a commitment from Ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez that she would personally review the case.

Further inciting Mendoza’s anger, his brother told him “not to surrender.”

Yebra, however, noted he was able to “appease” Mendoza on the promise that he could talk to his superiors to temporarily suspend a decision discharging him from the service.

Critical moments

Yebra said the media was not used as an option because he was still trying to contact all phones provided to the hostage-taker.

This has become the critical moment in the hostage crisis, when Mendoza supposedly saw on television the arrest of his brother. It is also presumed that he was on the phone then talking to RMN reporters.

Mendoza started to open fire in only a matter of minutes.

Another review committee member, Integrated Bar of the Philippines representative Roan Libarios, however, noted the crisis management committee should have raised this same option earlier in the day since this was what Mendoza really wanted.

Libarios also raised a recent decision of the Supreme Court—Ombudsman versus Samaniego—that only orders or decisions in administrative cases imposing the penalty of suspension of not more than a month shall be final and can’t be appealed. It should also be immediately executory.

Mendoza was dismissed from service even without a final decision on his motion for reconsideration.

Yebra said he raised this with the crisis committee. He noted, however, that Mayor Lim had reservations.

He said Lim ordered a thorough study of the option since this may be used as a precedent in future hostage-taking incidents.

It was also about the same time that Lim invited some of the higher authorities to transfer to the Emerald Restaurant.

“Meron din kasi suggestion from the mayor ‘para makakain na rin. Anyway, we can wear him out [Mendoza],” Yebra said.

Why not subdue Mendoza?

Yebra admitted there were other options to end the hostage crisis, including subduing the gunman.

There were several instances where this option could have been used, he said.

He said this was brought up to the higher authorities “pero sabi ko, mahirap yata yun. Hindi ko gagawin.”

Yebra later requested for an executive session with the committee members, saying he could not say in open court why this option was not used. He said any information on police tactics on hostage handling could be used by other hostage-takers.

“The only thing I can say is that there’s no such necessity [at that time] for anybody of us to subdue him,” Yebra said.