An oft-repeated contention is that the Philippines is a weak state. As a counterpoint to this curse of being, the Gloria Macapagal Arroyo administration adopted the slogan “Strong Republic.” That’s why newly-bought cars in the last five years or so have “Matatag na Republika” embossed on their plates, with the phallic-like (an image equated with strength) monument for Jose Rizal at the Luneta as backdrop.

The administration eventually dropped the “strong republic” rhetoric and, needless to say, we have remained a weak state. In fact, we are close to become a “failing” state, if not yet a failed one*.

A state is weak when its capacity to exercise “social control” is not only low but also fragmented. There is no rule of law. The national government cannot convincingly enforce order and exercise governance, especially in peripheral areas like Maguindanao. Under a weak criminal justice system, one can hardly expect justice for victims of human rights violations. (Justice, by the way, is an important concept in the study of politics since classic political thought considered justice as the motivation and end goal of political society.)

Weak state-strong society trap

In his famous work, the social scientist Joel Migdal looked at the problem of a weak state in a “strong society” – which apparently applies to the Philippines as well. In a “strong society,” influential groups make tremendous demands on the state. In our context, such influential groups include the business sector, religious institutions and the gamut of lords -- warlords, jueteng lords, drug lords and landlords. These lords are all adept at skirting government regulations. Held captive by such powerful societal groups, state institutions cannot effectively implement and enforce policies, laws and programs.

Actually, the problems associated with the weak state-strong society conundrum such as the culture of impunity and local strongmen are not too different from those illuminated by the notions of a patrimonial state and bossism, which we discussed last column.

It is ironic that we remain a weak state despite our highly centralized and unitary system, and the tendency of Philippine presidents to centralize even more control in his/her office and person. The latter tendency has been called “presidentialismo” or “overpresidentialism” by Latin American social scientists who have far too often seen their presidents behaving in this manner.

Authoritarian regimes do not necessarily reside in or give birth to strong states. Even Marcos had to accommodate vested interests to win support. He compromised on his agenda to ward off challengers. In the process, he only further weakened our state institutions – the military, legislature and judiciary. We tried to correct this legacy of the Marcos regime but 22 years later, it seems we are back where we started.

To date, administrative and regulatory agencies and the relationship of the executive with local governments and supposedly independent state bodies remain highly politicized and compromised.

Survival and dynamism in a weak state

If we have such a weak state, how come it is able to do all the wrong things? Why hasn;t it collapsed? Well, even a so-called weak state has power and resources. However, it is using its power and resources for other ends, such as by thwarting laws and processes to protect and perpetuate the incumbents.

In the Philippine context, the national state’s lack of functional capacity is compensated by patronage or clientelist ties with societal groups and groups or cliques in state institutions – for example, the exchange of favors with a certain class or selected officers in the AFP, and cooperative local government officials and legislators.

Kyoto University-based Filipino scholar Patricio “Jojo” Abinales attributes the survival of the national state to the “mutual accommodation” that defines the relationship between the national and local political forces, notably , the practice of those at the top to nurture local power bases even at the expense of the law or decorum.

The frames we have discussed help us understand why such a thing as the Maguindanao massacre happened. They help illuminate different facets of our state and society. Thus, these concepts or frameworks do not necessarily cancel out each other, although they are often contrasted with each other. Under certain circumstances, certain features will stand out. Reciprocity, accommodation, contestation and violence go hand in hand in various degrees across time and place, and outcomes are not predetermined. There are times or instances where politics are played out in nonviolent contestation, and also circumstances when use of violence and coercion overtakes benevolent reciprocity, as has been happening in Maguindanao under the tutelage of the national administration.

This shows that Philippine politics has a certain dynamism. We see this in rise and fall of “strongmen” despite the persistence of some clans in politics. The Ampatuans were not even in our radar screen until some eight years ago, the period when they consolidated their hold in Central Mindanao. During the Marcos regime, the leading strongman in Muslim Mindanao was Ali Dimaporo.

An important factor surrounding this dynamism is power turnover. These turnovers are hotly contested through elections, “people power” or coup attempts. Each leadership change occasions new political and socio-economic alignments, and changes in leadership style and qualities, strengths and priorities, even as the structural infirmities remain and the leadership grapples with or succumbs to the same legacy of the kind of state formation that evolved in the Philippines.

We have highlighted the structural features of the state but we cannot as yet fully explain why such an unthinkable event as the Maguindanao massacre happened. Why in Maguindanao and why now?

The features of the GMA administration and its Ampatuan protégés provide the specific context why it happened now, and why in Maguindanao. Next week, we’ll move from structural to conjunctural analysis to answer these questions.

E-mail: mcf178@yahoo.com

*Robert Rotberg (2004) describes a failed state as one marked by enduring violence, though not necessarily always of high level of intensity. It is tense, deeply conflicted, dangerous and contested bitterly by warring factions, with varieties of civil unrest and two or more insurgencies, different degrees of communal discontent and other forms of dissent directed against it and at groups within it. Parts of the territory are not under its control. There is high level of physical insecurity among citizens, thus they are armed or they join rebel groups. The society endures a high level of criminal violence, and delivery of socio-economic goods is limited. Its institutions are flawed; its infrastructure, deteriorating or destroyed.

This three-part series is based on the presentation made by the author at the public forum, “The Maguindanao Massacre, Perspectives from the Social Sciences” held on 19 January 2010, Bulwagang Claro M Recto, University of the Philippines, Diliman. Other discussants were professors Julkipli Wadi, Eufracio Abaya, Jamail Kamlian, and Eugenio Demegillo, Jr . The forum was sponsored by the UP Third World Studies Center, College of Social Sciences and Philosophy, Department of Political Science, Philippine Political Science Association and Asia Foundation. The video of the forum can be viewed at http://uptwsc.blogspot.com/.