The structural view focuses on the historical and institutional contexts of an event. That’s why to explain why the Maguindanao massacre happened, we first focused on the Philippines state – that is, its structures that sustain patrimonialism, bossism and misdirected state capacity.

However, in explaining specific incidents or phenomenon, we need to do conjunctural analysis.

In Latin American political studies, conjunctural analysis examines the intersection of different acts and motivations of individuals and forces. In a way, it highlights the function of agency or how specific groups or individuals doing certain acts or behaving in a certain manner at a given time lead to certain outcomes. It also implies that despite the rigidity of structures, not everything is predetermined.

Actions are constrained or enhanced by the circumstances of the moment. So,although a moment is lodged within social and political structures, depending on the trajectory of more recent events and the confluence of acts and interests of people, outcomes can be quite unique. That’s why history is sprinkled with “awesome” moments that are “great” (such as EDSA 1), or despicable, as in the case of the Maguindanao massacre. Whether the massacre, like EDSA 1, can evolve into a turning point for Maguindanao politics remains to be seen.

Conjunctural analysis is not as abstract as it sounds so please do read on.

The GMA presidency

To begin, we’d need to look at the specific features of the nine-year GMA presidency and the security and governance apparatus built by her administration. For convenience, we will divide the period into two: GMA I which began in GMA’s ascent to the presidency through irregular means in 2001, and GMA II, that began with her questionable election to a six-year presidential term in 2004. The GMA I period ideally should have been a transition to a regularly elected president. In other words, there should have been no GMA II. GMA II saw the entrenchment of Arroyo and her allies, despite being hounded by legitimacy questions.

GMA’s unduly long presidency allowed her to consolidate a network of patron-client ties that operated through her political coalition and specific bilateral deals forged with local leaders. Like her, most of these loyal officials similarly enjoyed uninterrupted power.

Compared to previous administrations after Marcos, during this period, local governments were heavily encouraged to procure arms and organize militias to fight those opposed to the government. These militias conveniently became “private armies” at their disposal. The massive arming in turn unleashed an arms race with those disenfranchised or aiming to capture the posts monopolized by the incumbent-allies.

The armed might at the local government’s disposal; the easy access to IRAs and national government-allocated development funds; the legal and illegal business opportunities opened up; and the protection and impunity from the law all enhanced the stature of these local politicians who stayed close to the administration.

But the Ampatuans were particularly favored because they were useful to the government in another, important way. As has been said many times, the Ampatuans sitting in Maguindanao and the regional government delivered the votes to GMA in 2004, and again to her allies in 2007. It was a most beneficial, stable relationship that was built on the mutual satisfaction of their respective temporal interests.

Threatened stability

This stability was threatened by the forthcoming election because there was a Mangundadatu clan that was ready to challenge the Arroyo-Ampatuan relationship. Were there none, there would have been no “Maguindanao massacre”.

We are informed by Eugenio Demegillo Jr.,’s historical account that the Mangundadatu clan descended from Rajah Buayan, who ruled over the upper valleys of Central Mindanao in ancient times. In effect, the Mangundadatu’s aristocratic lineage, their men, arms and economic base provide them with the capacity to compete with the hitherto commoners, the Ampatuans. Thus, while the Mangundadatu clan acceded in the last eight years to the Ampatuan senior’s hold over the heartland of the old Cotabato empire, they were not willing to bow down for another three to nine years to an Ampatuan junior.

The massacre could have been averted had the Ampatuan successfully divided Maguindanao province into three, in an opportunistic sharing of spoils with the Mastura, Sinsuat, Mangundadatu and Paglas clans. But the carving out of Shariff Kabunsuan for the Masturas and Sinsuata was nullified by the Supreme Court. The prospective third province for the Mangundadatus and Paglases could not meet the minimum requirements to constitute a separate province.

The massacre need not have happened had the Arroyo administration put checks on the Ampatuan. But no, it was apparently all set to support that trigger-happy, arrogant and ignoramus of an heir to Ampatuan Sr. for governorship in the June election. So they “advised” the Mangundadatus to back off. The administration was not lifting a finger to stop the Ampatuan menace. They were, for all intents and purposes, willing to benefit again from the Ampatuans this coming election, just as the Ampatuans are to benefit from government blessings.

The events wouldn’t have happened the way they did had the Mangundadatu not underestimated the extent the Ampatuan would go to nip competition in the bud. Or as some surmised, it wouldn’t have been a massacre, but a firefight or a battlefield (but certainly not a rebellion), or serial assassinations of one camp against the other (effectively a rido or clan feud) had the Mangundadatu chosen to counter-act the Ampatuan with guns at the first instance.

But the actors, given the circumstances, chose to act in the manner that they did, resulting in one of the bloodiest days in Philippine contemporary history.

Reforming the state

What now?

Justice must take its course to redress the deaths of almost 60 people and all other victims of the reign of the Ampatuans. But beyond the Ampatuan clan, we need to reform the state.

We have to strengthen and insulate the state institutions from the machinations of the national leadership; transform the orientation of local governments and wean them away from presidential patronage; and put a stop to political violence through the rule of law.

The 1987 Constitution already provided some of the legal measures to achieve these. The provisions on term limits, anti-political dynasty, the party-list system, prohibition on private armies, devolution, regional autonomy, electoral and military reforms are all steps toward this end. But they continue to be thwarted by our law-breaking political elites.

How do we pressure the next government leadership to take decisive action? Where will that the pressure come from? From the middle class, the masa, civil society organizations, the youth and/or the military reformers? What cultural resources can help in the transformation? All these would need to be discussed in another forum.

E-mail: mcf178@yahoo.com

This three-part series is based on the presentation made by the author at the public forum, “The Maguindanao Massacre, Perspectives from the Social Sciences” held on 19 January 2010, Bulwagang Claro M Recto, University of the Philippines, Diliman. Other discussants were professors Julkipli Wadi, Eufracio Abaya, Jamail Kamlian, and Eugenio Demegillo, Jr . The forum was sponsored by the UP Third World Studies Center, College of Social Sciences and Philosophy, Department of Political Science, Philippine Political Science Association and Asia Foundation. The video of the forum can be viewed at http://uptwsc.blogspot.com/.