Since before martial law, law enforcers have been helpless vs civilian forces of local execs associated with the President.

(First of 2 parts)

MANILA, Philippines - The massacre of the wife, sister, and followers of a gubernatorial aspirant Ishmael Mangudadatu in Maguindanao on November 23 might have been avoided if only the government had faithfully and fully implemented the constitutional ban on private armies.

The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) has the capability to crush them, yet private armies persist such that our elections remain prone to electoral terrorism and violence.

Article XVIII, Section 24 of the Constitution says: “Private armies and other armed groups not recognized by duly constituted authority shall be dismantled. All paramilitary forces including Civilian Home Defense Forces not consistent with the citizen armed force established in this Constitution, shall be dissolved or, where appropriate, converted into the regular force.”

The provision does not directly task the AFP with the dismantling of private armies, but there is nothing to prohibit the President, as commander in chief, from telling the AFP to do so.

The President appears to have not done so. The solution seems to be to ignore the existence of private armies, which, after all, can be useful come election time, provided that they are on the side of the administration. This explains why election-related violence remains high even outside the official campaign period.

Just police work?

The President can point a finger at the Commission on Elections (Comelec) as the entity designated by law to deal with private armies. After all, the Omnibus Election Code has provisions (Section 261 [m] and [u]) that require members of private armies—described more benignly therein as “reaction forces, strike forces or other similar forces” and as “special policemen, special agents, confidential agents or the like”—to be listed by their employers, for the “information” of the Comelec.

The same Code, however, does not mandate the Comelec to cause their dismantling. Also, between election periods, it is obvious that the Comelec cannot have jurisdiction over such private armed forces, or their dismantling.

Congress, on the other hand, has not passed legislation that would give teeth to the Constitution’s command that private armies be dismantled. The Congress has neither defined what a private army is, nor identified who the “duly constituted authority” empowered to recognize them is. But this is not to be wondered at, because various influential solons belong to clans, if not political dynasties (another term that the Congress has failed to define) identified with private armies. Nor is it to be expected that such private armies, out of respect for the Constitution, will self-destruct.

In the face of such seeming apathy or indifference of political and election officials, the AFP can hardly be expected to do anything. Unlike the Philippine National Police (PNP), the AFP is not vested by law with police powers. In practical terms, it is the PNP that is left to take the initiative of going after private armies.

An example of this was provided in 1995, when the PNP Intelligence Command in Camp Crame, apparently without having been directed to do so by the Comelec, applied for a search warrant 3 days before the May 8 elections to raid the residence of Florentino P. Blanco, a candidate for the mayoralty of Meycauayan, Bulacan, based on reports that he was maintaining a private army.

The raid resulted in the arrest of 6 men with various high-powered firearms for which they had no licenses or permits; evidence of a massive vote-buying operation was also obtained. Thus, although Blanco got 6,700 votes more than his rival Eduardo Alarilla, Blanco was disqualified by the Comelec, and Vice Mayor-elect Edgardo C. Nolasco became the mayor.

Moises Padilla's killer

In the past, when the police were still under the sway of local officials, they tended to be used to augment the private armies of some of such officials. Some private armies became so powerful that government forces were quite helpless to act against them, particularly if the private armies were under persons identified with the President.

For the 1951 murder of Moises Padilla in Negros Occidental, ex-Governor Rafael Lacson and 2 ex-mayors were charged, along with 3 chiefs of police and 14 policemen, 5 special policemen, and an acting provincial warden.

The special policemen and provincial guards were organized, armed, and controlled by the governor, who was a member of the Liberal Party and who claimed to have contributed greatly to the election of President Elpidio Quirino in 1949.

Moises Padilla was a candidate in the Nov. 13, 1951 elections for mayor of the newly-created municipality of Magallon, under the Nacionalista Party banner. He refused to withdraw his candidacy. At 2 a.m. of November 15, he was arrested by special policemen, ahead of the issuance of a warrant to search his house for firearms. He was manhandled, then charged with sedition, but was not delivered to the court.

The next day, he was taken out of solitary confinement and tortured. The small Constabulary team sent to check on his condition was badly outnumbered and outgunned, and could not make the special policemen turn him over to them. Later, after more beatings, Padilla was shot to death, and some civilians were ordered to bring his cadaver to his mother. An autopsy in Manila revealed that he was shot 15 times, 11 of them in the back, 10 of them fatal, four of them from a distance of less than a meter.

Magsaysay's ally

Defense Secretary Ramon Magsaysay ordered an investigation. It emerged at the trial that Governor Lacson had a private army of around 1,000 men, well-equipped with firearms and vehicles, under his absolute and exclusive command, while the Constabulary had only 1 company in Negros Occidental, and the PC provincial commander was indebted to him for his promotion.

The conviction of Lacson and several others was eventually upheld by the Supreme Court. Lacson was sentenced to reclusion perpetua as a principal by inducement. Sentenced to death were La Castellana ex-mayor Manuel Ramos, Magallon police chief Ceferino Laos, special policemen Joaquin Tolentino, Ernesto Camalon, Norberto Jabonete, and Felix Alipalo, and La Castellana policeman Vicente Hijar. Several others were found guilty as accomplices.

The conviction of Lacson and some of his henchmen did not deter the formation of private armies. Some 3 months before the declaration of martial law in September 1972, 11 members of a private army in Pangasinan, all armed with rifles, were charged for summarily executing 3 men whom they suspected to be cattle rustlers. All 3 were shot in the head.

One of the accused included a policeman, and 2 of those who testified for the defense were also policemen, who were suspected of having been with the group during the killings. Unfortunately, the Court’s decision in this case, upholding the conviction of four of the accused, did not identify whose private army they belonged to.

(To be concluded)